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Pegah Rahmani
Not all logic is loud; some choices whisper, and I listen.
PhD Candidate, University of Toronto
Not all logic is loud; some choices whisper, and I listen.
PhD Candidate, University of Toronto
I am a PhD candidate in Economics at the University of Toronto. My research lies at the intersection of Behavioral Economics and Decision Theory, with a focus on how individuals make context-dependent decisions under uncertainty.
I am particularly interested in correlation-sensitive models of decision-making, especially in settings where preferences may be incomplete. My current work develops and analyzes incomplete correlation-sensitive models to better understand how individuals navigate uncertainty when standard preference assumptions fail to hold.
I am on the 2025-2026 academic job market.Interests: Behavioral Economics, Microeconomic Theory, Decision Theory, Experimental Economics
References: Yoram Halevy, Marcin Pęski, Colin Stewart
This paper develops a unified axiomatic framework for decision making under uncertainty, from which both correlation-sensitive and expected multi-utility models emerge as special cases. Unlike standard correlation-sensitive models that assume completeness, it allows incomparability by replacing completeness with two natural axioms: reflexivity, requiring consistency under symmetric comparisons, and monotonicity, ensuring that mixtures with incomparable options cannot reverse existing preferences. When transitivity is additionally imposed, the framework collapses to the expected multi-utility model. The framework offers a foundation for understanding how incompleteness, correlation sensitivity, and transitivity jointly shape choice under uncertainty.
A well-known phenomenon in the decision science literature (Loomes and Sugden 1982, Bell 1982, and Fishburn 1982) is that anticipated regret affects choices and valuations. We analyze Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) famous decision problem of the certainty effect – a special case of the common ratio effect ´a la Allais (1953) as well as extensively documented probability insensitivity in mid-ranges. We propose that these phenomena are, in fact, manifestations of anticipated regret; offer a behavioral definition of anticipated regret without committing to a specific functional representation; and document evidence of anticipated regret in a controlled lab setting. We find that more than half of our participants exhibit strict Certainty Effect, and about two-fifths of them exhibit aversion to anticipated regret.
Course Instructor:
Course materials are available upon request.
TA:
Phone: 437-987-1545
Email: pegah.rahmani@mail.utoronto.ca
Office:
Office 40, Economics Department, University of Toronto
Max Gluskin House, 150 St. George Street
Toronto ON M5S 3G7
Canada
Links: TEEL @ UofT | LinkedIn